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RECONSIDERING CONTRACTUAL WAIVERS OF THE
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN FEDERAL COURT
Amanda R. Szuch*

I. INTRODUCTION
Contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial are increasingly
inserted into agreements creating a conflict between the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial and the freedom to contract. Disputes
over these contract provisions between citizens of different states will
undoubtedly lead to more federal courts sitting in diversity being faced
with the decision of whether federal or state law is to be applied. Thus
far, courts have consistently avoided making the choice of law
determination under the required guidance of the Erie doctrine, and have
instead applied inconsistent and irrelevant standards in drawing choice
of law conclusions.
Part II of this Comment will introduce the Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial and various standards that have been applied at the state
and federal level to the validity of contractual jury waivers. Part II also
addresses the standards that apply to the validity of other forms of jury
right waiver. Lastly, it will explore the method of determining whether
federal or state law is to be applied in federal courts sitting in diversity.
Part III of this Comment will outline the conflicting approaches taken by
circuit courts addressing contractual waivers of the jury right. Part IV
will explain the irrelevance of Simler v. Conner to determining the
validity of contractual waivers of the jury right and will conduct an Erie
analysis to conclude that there is no bright-line rule as to whether courts
sitting in diversity are to apply federal or state law when determining the
validity of contractual jury right waivers. Lastly, this Comment argues
that if federal law is to be applied, the less rigorous standard, similar to
that of arbitration agreements, should be applied to waivers of the jury
right.

* Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank her editors, God, her friends and family, especially her parents, David and Antoinette Szuch, for
their support, encouragement and patience throughout law school.
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II. BACKGROUND
The Constitution of the United States guarantees numerous
protections to the citizens of the United States. With the increased use
of waivers of the right to a jury trial, there are conflicts between the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and the freedom to contract.
There are also several methods for waiving the right to a jury trial
including: contractual waiver, waiver by agreement to arbitrate, and
Rule 38(d) waiver by failure to request. Each of these types of waiver is
subject to varying degrees of scrutiny, and ambiguity exists as to the
standard to be applied under federal law as well as the varying scrutiny
applied by individual states, when applying state law with regard to
contractual waivers. These conflicts are apparent when a dispute over a
contractual waiver of the right to a jury trial is moved into federal court
sitting in diversity because the court must resolve the choice of law issue
in order to establish the relevant standard to be applied to the waiver. In
order to resolve the choice of law issue, the courts must tackle the Erie
doctrine, established in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and its progeny, which set
forth the rules governing choice of law issues. This Part discusses the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and various ways that right can
be waived. Next, it explores the varying state and federal contractual
jury right waiver standards. Lastly, this Part gives a background of Erie
and explains the Erie doctrine analysis courts have used and should
apply in future cases when resolving conflicts of law while sitting in
diversity in federal court.
A. Seventh Amendment
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” 1 The
Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 However, almost
all states protect the right to a trial by jury through their state
constitutions. 3 The Seventh Amendment extends the right to a jury trial

1. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
2. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (“The Court has not held that the right to
jury trial in civil cases is an element of due process applicable to state courts through the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
3. Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:
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in federal civil cases where, if tried in 1791, would have had a common
law right to trial by jury. 4 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury to apply to mixed cases involving
equity and law and has asserted that “only under the most imperative
circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures
of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury
trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable
claims.” 5 The Court has held that the right to a jury trial may be
waived. 6 The Supreme Court has also held that the right to a trial by
jury is a fundamental guarantee, and “every reasonable presumption
should be indulged against its waiver.” 7
B. Methods for Waiver of the Jury Right
Waiver of the jury right can be exacted in several ways, each subject
to varying degrees of scrutiny by the courts. Arbitration clauses allow
for parties to agree in advance to forego dispute resolution in the court
system and instead “present their case to a neutral third party decisionmaker instead of a judge, jury, or administrative agency.” 8 As a result,
an agreement to arbitrate implicitly includes a waiver of the right to a
jury trial. The standard applied to determine the validity of consent to
arbitrate is the same as contract law consent standards 9 and was
established by the Federal Arbitration Act. 10 The contract approach to
agreements consenting to arbitrate applies “mutual manifestations of
assent” 11 to validate consent, by which “[t]he requirement to form a
contract is not that parties actually assent to its terms. . . . [but] that they
take actions—such as signing their names on a document or saying
Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 797 (1977).
4. Rachael E. Schwartz, “Everything Depends on How You Draw the Lines”: An Alternative
Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 599, 600 (citing 5 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 38.08 42 (Daniel R. Coquillette, et al., eds., 2d ed.
1995)).
5. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959); see also Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472–73 (1962).
6. Bank of Columbia v. Okley, 17 U.S. 235, 244 (1819).
7. Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882).
8. Brian D. Weber, Contractual Waivers of a Right to Jury Trial – Another Option, 53 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 717, 726 (2006).
9. Stephen J. Ware, Mandatory Arbitration: Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and
Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 167, 170 (2004).
10. Id. “[T]he Federal Arbitration Act provides that a ‘written provision . . . to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.’” Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)).
11. Id. at 171.
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certain words—that would lead a reasonable person to believe that they
have assented to the terms of the contract.” 12
The jury right can also be waived inadvertently through a failure to
properly and timely request a jury trial. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
38(d) states that “[a] party waives a jury trial unless its demand is
properly served and filed.” 13 Waiver can be exacted by accidentally
failing to file a proper request, so the standard applied to this type of
contractual waiver is extremely low.
A final means to waive the jury right is through consent in a preexecuted contractual agreement. The standard applied to contractual
waiver of the jury right has been inconsistent in the lower courts,
specifically surrounding the issue of whether federal or state law applies.
Erie R.R. v. Tomkins and its progeny established the methods for
determining whether state or federal law is to be applied in federal
courts, which has become known as the Erie doctrine and will be
explored later in this Comment.
C. Federal Versus State Law Contractual Jury Waiver Standards
This subpart will explain the somewhat ambiguous federal standard
that has been applied to contractual jury right waivers. It also addresses
the varying state law standards applied when state courts have addressed
contractual waivers of the jury right.
1. Federal Standard
The Supreme Court has never expressed a specific standard for civil
cases evaluating the contractual waiver of the jury right, 14 but the Court
has applied a “knowing, voluntary, intentional standard” in criminal
cases involving waiver of constitutional rights. 15 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals has acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Fuentes
v. Shevin 16 “in applying the knowing and voluntary standard to a waiver
of due process rights in a conditional sales agreement, cautioned that it
was ‘not holding that [the] standards [governing waiver of constitutional

12. Id. (quoting Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 83, 113 (1996) (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 8.5 (3d ed. 1999))).
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d).
14. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 678 (2001).
15. See id. at n.40 (citing Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).
16. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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rights in a criminal proceeding] must necessarily apply.’” 17 The Fuentes
Court established that a waiver of a constitutional right “must, at the
very least, be clear.” 18 With limited exceptions, the lower courts have
applied the heightened standard “variously expressed in words such as
knowing, voluntary, and intentional” in determining the legitimacy of
contractual waivers of the jury right. 19
2. State Standard
Standards applied to determine the validity of contractual waivers of
the jury right differ depending upon the state law being applied. The
Seventh Circuit, in applying Illinois state law to jury right waivers held
that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 20 applied and no heightened
requirement of separate signing or separate negotiation existed. 21 Other
states have used ordinary contract standards to determine the
enforceability of contractual waivers. 22 Still other states such as
Georgia and California have held that contractual waivers of the jury
right cannot be enforced. 23 Moreover, “[c]ontractual jury waivers are
unenforceable in Montana by statute and in Oklahoma by constitutional
provision.” 24 Finally, many states have adopted the heightened federal
standards requiring voluntary, knowing and intentional waiver and strict
construction of the waivers. 25

17. K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting Fuentes,
407 U.S. at 94).
18. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95.
19. Sternlight, supra note 14.
20. The Uniform Commercial Code was created in response to a need for “greater uniformity
among the states in commercial law” and is a collection of “revised versions of the most significant
uniform acts adopted earlier in the twentieth century by the National Conference of Commissioners.”
CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., RULES OF CONTRACT LAW: SELECTIONS FROM THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, THE CISG, THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, AND THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES,
WITH MATERIAL ON CONTRACT DRAFTING AND SAMPLE EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 1–2 (2007).
21. I.F.C. Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir.
2008).
22. Brian S. Thomley, Comment, Nothing is Sacred: Why Georgia and California Cannot Bar
Contractual Waivers in Federal Court, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 127, 134 (2008) (citing L&R Realty v. Conn.
Nat’l Bank, 715 A.2d 748, 753 (Conn. 1998)).
23. Id. (citing Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 799 (Ga. 1994); Grafton Partners, L.P.
v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 493 (Cal. 2005)).
24. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (2007); OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 8).
25. Robert Frankhouser, The Enforceability of Pre-Dispute Jury Waiver Agreements in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 8 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 55, 74 (2006) (citing Jay M. Zitter, Annotation,
Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases, 42 A.L.R. 5th 53 (2004)).
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D. The Erie Doctrine
The Erie doctrine, as established and developed in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins and its progeny, provides a roadmap for determining whether
federal or state law is to be applied by federal courts sitting in diversity
jurisdiction. This determination is significant with regard to contractual
waivers of the right to a jury trial because contract disputes, which are
typically resolved in state courts, can be removed to federal court on the
basis of the diversity of citizenship of the parties to the litigation. The
federal court sitting in diversity must determine which law to apply.
This Comment will first explore the relevant statutes applicable to an
Erie analysis and explain the evolution of the doctrine through Supreme
Court decisions. This Comment will next establish the diverging paths
of the analysis through exploration of Supreme Court decisions applying
and developing the doctrine.
1. Relevant Statutes
Two relevant statutes relate to the application of the Erie doctrine.
The Rules Enabling Act 26 provides that
(a) [t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United
States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof)
and courts of appeals; (b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect. 27

Essentially, this gives the Supreme Court the authority to enact
procedural rules for federal courts and establishes that any law that
conflicts with federal procedural law is not applicable in federal court.
The Rules of Decision Act 28 (RDA) provides that “[t]he laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply.” 29 The RDA establishes that in civil
actions in federal court, state law is to be applied unless the federal
Constitution, treaties, or statute governs the issue.

26.
27.
28.
29.

28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
Id.
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2. Swift v. Tyson
In Swift v. Tyson, 30 the Supreme Court interpreted the word “laws” in
the RDA to include state statutes and local customs only, and not the
state court decisions or state common law, established by state courts. 31
Swift was a diversity case brought in federal court in New York because
it centered on the enforcement of a bill of exchange and turned on
“whether a pre-existing debt constituted consideration for an
endorsement of the bill, making the endorsee a ‘holder in due course.’” 32
The outcome of the case depended upon whether federal common law or
New York common law applied. 33 The Court narrowly construed the
language of the RDA to apply only state statutes and local customs and
did not require the federal courts to apply state common law. 34 Swift
established that in diversity cases, federal courts were to apply state
statutes and local customs, but could disregard state common law on
issues including contract interpretation and commercial law and should
instead look to “general principles and doctrines” in making decisions. 35
The doctrine established in Swift was highly controversial, 36 and led to
judicial decisions that affirmed abusive behavior. 37 Despite the

30. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
31. Id. at 18–19.
32. RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 919 (4th ed. 2008).
33. Id. Federal common law would have found valid consideration while New York common
law would have concluded that there was invalid consideration. Id.
34. See Swift, 41 U.S. at 18–19. The Supreme Court stated that “[i]n the ordinary use of
language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of the Courts constitute laws. They are, at most,
only evidence of what the laws are; and are not of themselves laws.” Id.
35. See id. at 19.
36. See TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 92 (1981) (“By the 1890s the Swift doctrine had become a center of controversy dividing
the nation’s bar, proponents of federal judicial reform in Congress, the judges of the lower federal
courts, and the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see also Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945) (“During the period when Swift v. Tyson (1842–1938) ruled the decisions
of the federal courts, its theory of their freedom in matters of general law from the authority of state
courts pervaded opinions of this Court involving even state statutes or local law.” (quoting Vandenbark
v. Owens-Illinois Co., 311 U.S. 538, 540 (1941))).
37. For example, Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co. involved a
contractual agreement between Louisville and Nashville Railroad and Brown & Yellow Taxicab, for the
exclusive rights to board trains and solicitation of passengers as well as use of land to await arrival of
trains. Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 522–23 (1928). The
railroad company was incorporated in Kentucky and initially Brown & Yellow was incorporated in
Kentucky, but reincorporated in Tennessee in order to create diversity of citizenship that would allow
the controversy to be reconciled in federal, rather than state court. Id. at 522–24. Brown and Yellow
sued to enjoin Black and White, a competing Kentucky corporation, for interfering with the agreement
by soliciting passengers in violation of the contractual agreement between Brown and the railroad. Id.
Although state common law decisions invalidated similar contracts, the Supreme Court, in upholding the
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controversy, the holding in Swift was controlling law for 96 years until
the case was overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 38 in 1938.
3. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
The Supreme Court’s decision in Erie stood for several propositions:
(1) state law should be applied in cases unless the issue is governed by
the Federal Constitution or federal statutes; 39 (2) state law includes state
statutes and state common law; 40 (3) “there is no federal general
common law;” 41 and (4) the holding in Swift created an
“unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United
States.” 42 Erie involved a Pennsylvania citizen, Tompkins, who was
injured after being struck by a door on a freight train belonging to the
Erie Railroad Company, a New York corporation, which was passing by
him as he walked alongside the right of way. 43 Tompkins brought an
action against Erie Railroad alleging negligence. 44 Erie argued that
Pennsylvania common law applied, which would have declared
Tompkins to be a trespasser and would have reduced Erie’s liability to
cases involving wanton and willful negligence as opposed to ordinary
negligence. 45 Tomkins argued that federal general common law should
be applied, and Pennsylvania common law was irrelevant. 46
The holding in Erie established that unless the issue deals with the
injunction, relied on Swift and stated that the federal courts were “free to exercise their own independent
judgment” on questions of general law. See id. at 527–30.
38. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
39. Id. at 78.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S.
518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
43. Id. at 69.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See id. The Supreme Court cited several reasons for its decision to overturn Swift. First, the
court established that the Supreme Court misinterpreted the RDA in Swift by excluding state common
law in its interpretation of “laws.” See id. at 71–74. Secondly, the Supreme Court stated that the
benefits of a more uniform state common law and increased certainty expected to result from Swift never
came to fruition. See id. at 74. Thirdly, the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of diversity of
citizenship, to prevent non-citizens from discrimination in state courts, was being thwarted by the
application of the doctrine of Swift, which was creating an avenue for non-citizens to discriminate
against citizens through the use of forum shopping and abuse of the lack of uniformity in the law. See
id. at 74–75. The court noted that citizens willing to relocate to another state could reap the benefits of
diversity jurisdiction and the federal general common law. Finally, the Supreme Court asserted that the
holding in Swift was unconstitutional. Id. at 77–78 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules
of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’” and “no clause
in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”).
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Federal Constitution or Acts of Congress, state substantive law,
including state common law, should be applied. 47 Erie established that
state substantive law was to be applied by the federal courts in diversity
cases, but federal procedure was to be applied. 48 Federal courts often
struggled with the divide between procedural law and substantive law.
Procedure has been defined as “the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” 49
4. Hanna v. Plumer
Subsequent cases established the diverging paths of analysis under
Erie.
Hanna v. Plumer and its progeny govern the judicial
determination of what law is to be applied when the case is governed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The second path of Erie analysis
involves cases where no federal rule or statute directly controls the issue,
which requires the courts to apply the RDA with regard to the “twin
aims of Erie.”
a. Hanna and the REA
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hanna, the Court decided
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 50 which established an “outcome
determinative” test that ignored the distinction between substance and
procedure and held that in diversity cases in federal court, the federal
court should defer to the state rule if ignoring it could result in the
determination of the case being decided differently in federal rather than
state court. 51 The elimination of the line between substance and
procedure following York led to several decisions which held that state
procedures should apply in diversity in the face of conflicting federal
rules seemingly on point. 52
In Hanna v. Plumer, the Supreme Court held that in diversity actions

47. See id.
48. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
49. Id. at 464 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
50. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
51. See id. at 108–09.
52. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (In a stockholder’s
derivative action, the Supreme Court applied a New Jersey statute requiring plaintiff to give security
instead of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 with no security requirements); Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (In determining proper tolling of the statute of
limitations, the Supreme Court applied a Kansas statute that required service of summons to begin
tolling and not Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, which requires filing of a complaint.).
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where a federal rule directly conflicts with state procedural law, the
Rules Enabling Act (REA), and not the RDA as construed by Erie, is to
govern the decision and that federal courts should apply the federal rule
as long as the rule is not in violation of the REA. 53 Hanna involved a
suit filed in federal court in Massachusetts based on diversity between
Hanna, an Ohio resident, and the defendant, a Massachusetts resident. 54
The suit claimed damages stemming from injuries suffered by Hanna in
an automobile accident where the defendant was allegedly negligent. 55
The dispute centered on whether the statute of limitations had expired
based on inadequate service of process. 56 Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(1) at the time Hanna was decided, service was sufficient
if left at the dwelling with a person, 57 whereas under Massachusetts state
law, proper service required delivery in hand. 58 The Court concluded
that Rule 4(d)(1) “neither exceeded the congressional mandate embodied
in the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed constitutional bounds” and
the rule should have been used to determine the sufficiency of the
service of process. 59 The holding in Hanna established that when the
conflicting laws involve federal and state procedure, the federal rule
should govern unless the federal rule violates the REA. 60 Subsequent
cases clarified that if the federal rule is “‘sufficiently broad’ to cause a
‘direct collision’ with the state law or, implicitly, to ‘control the issue’
before the court,” the federal rule must be applied. 61

53. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470–71.
54. Id. at 461.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 461–62.
57. Id. “The summons and complaint shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the
person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows: (1) Upon an
individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of
the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein . . . .” Id.
58. Id. at 462 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 197, § 9 (1958) (“served by delivery in hand”)).
59. Id. at 464.
60. See id. at 471.
61. Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987) (citing Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1980); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471–72). The Supreme Court held that
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, which grants discretionary authority to courts to award
damages after concluding appeals were frivolous, governed a diversity action over a state law mandatory
penalty on unsuccessful appeals. See id. at 8. The Supreme Court concluded that the federal rule and
the state provision sufficiently conflicted through the federal rule’s discretionary impact and the state
provision’s mandatory effect. Therefore, the federal rule would preclude the application of the state
provision in diversity actions. Id. at 7.
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b. RDA and the Twin Aims of Erie
In cases not involving a conflict where a federal rule is directly on
point, conflict of law decisions are resolved under the RDA and the twin
aims of Erie. Few cases have explored the application of the RDA and
the twin aims of Erie, and the scope of the application has been limited.
In dicta, the Supreme Court in Hanna expressed that in conflicts not
arising from a federal rule, when determining whether state or federal
law should apply, York’s “outcome determinative” test is used with
reference to the twin aims of Erie, which are “discouragement of forumshopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.” 62
Forum shopping with regard to choice of law issues involves choosing
to issue a complaint and litigate in state or federal court on the basis of
the advantages a party would receive through application of the law of
the forum. Inequitable administration of the laws requires “allowing an
unfair discrimination between noncitizens and citizens of the forum
state.” 63 Inequitable administration of the law has also been explained
as being violated when one party to litigation has “access to a favorable
rule unilaterally.” 64 Inequitable administration has also been described
as “subjecting a person involved in litigation with a citizen of a different
state to a body of law different from that which applies when his next
door neighbor is involved in similar litigation with a co-citizen.” 65
The Supreme Court asserted that “every procedural variation is
‘outcome determinative.’” 66 The Court stated that “nonsubstantial, or
trivial, variations [in the law were] not likely to raise the sort of equal
protection problems which troubled the Court in Erie; they are also
unlikely to influence the choice of a forum.” 67 The Court concluded that
although the application of the federal rule would be “outcome
determinative,” the difference between the rules would not lead to forum
shopping or inequitable administration of the laws. 68 Under Hanna
62. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
63. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 40 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1938)).
64. Robert A. de By, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for Erie
Purposes, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1080 (1989).
65. Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reigning in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L.
REV. 305, 348 (1994) (quoting John H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 712
(1974)).
66. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 468–69. The Court stated that in choosing the forum, the difference between
federal and state law would not bar recovery, but would only change the manner of service of process.
Id. In concluding that there would not be inequitable administration of the laws, the Court stated that the
difference between in hand and third party service would not “alter[] the mode of enforcement of state-
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dicta, if the conflict of laws does not involve a federal rule, the
“outcome determinative” test of York is to be applied with reference to
the twin aims of Erie to determine if state or federal law applies. 69
In Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh, 70 Justice Scalia’s dissenting
opinion engaged in a full Erie analysis. 71 Stewart involved a dispute
over a dealership agreement that contained a forum selection clause
selecting state and federal courts in New York City or Manhattan as the
forum for any disputes. 72 Using diversity jurisdiction, the suit was filed
in federal court in Alabama, a state with law unfavorable to forum
selection clauses. 73 The respondent moved to have the case transferred
to the Southern District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 74 a
federal venue statute, or to have the case dismissed for improper
venue. 75 The majority concluded that § 1404(a) governed the dispute, 76
but Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, conceded that § 1404(a)
and the related state law were not “perfectly coextensive.” 77 In his
dissent, Justice Scalia concluded that § 1404(a) was not “sufficiently
broad to cause a direct collision with state law or implicitly to control
the issue before the Court.” 78 Justice Scalia noted that § 1404(a) “is
simply a venue provision that nowhere mentions contracts or
agreements, much less that the validity of certain contracts or
agreements will be matters of federal law.” 79 After reaching this
conclusion, Justice Scalia concluded that because there was no relevant
federal rule or statute guiding the legality of the clause, an analysis of
the twin aims of Erie was necessary to determine whether state or
federal judge-made law would control the issue. 80
Justice Scalia concluded that applying federal law would encourage
forum shopping because plaintiffs would sue in state court to avoid
enforcement of forum selection clauses, where nonresidents would seek
created rights in a fashion sufficiently ‘substantial’ to raise the sort of equal protection problems to
which the Erie opinion alluded” Id.
69. See id. at 467–68.
70. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
71. See id. at 34–41.
72. Id. at 24 n.1.
73. Id.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006). “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought.” Id.
75. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24.
76. Id. at 28.
77. Id. at 30.
78. Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 37.
80. See id. at 38–39.
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out favorable law in federal court. 81 Justice Scalia next addressed the
issue of inequitable administration of the laws, and concluded that the
outcome was chiefly determined by the importance of the question at
issue, and “[i]t is difficult to imagine an issue of more importance, other
than one that goes to the very merits of the lawsuit, than the validity of a
contractual forum-selection provision.” 82 Lastly, Justice Scalia noted
that courts cannot and should not “ignore that issues of contract validity
are traditionally matters governed by state law.” 83
When there is a choice of law issue, federal courts sitting in diversity
are to apply Erie and its progeny. Under the first path of Erie, governed
by Hanna, federal courts are to apply the REA and the federal rule when
the rule directly governs the issue. Under the second path, when there is
no federal rule or statute directly governing the issue, federal courts are
to apply the RDA and conduct a twin aims of Erie analysis to determine
whether application of federal law would lead to forum shopping or
inequitable administration of the laws. If either of these would result,
federal courts are to apply state law in resolving the dispute.
III. CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES TO JURY RIGHT WAIVERS
Several federal courts sitting in diversity have addressed the issue of
the validity of contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial. A majority
of courts have applied the federal “knowing, intentional, voluntary”
standard to determine the validity of the waivers. Recently, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals engaged in a limited Erie analysis to conclude
that state law governed the validity of a contractual waiver of the right to
a jury trial. This decision created a divide with the Second and Sixth
Circuits. This Part will explain the conflicting cases and the reasoning
behind each court’s decision.

81. See id. at 40.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 41. The twin aims or Erie were also analyzed in Chambers v. NASCO, where the
defendant argued that if “federal courts [could] use their inherent power to assess attorney’s fees as a
sanction in some cases, they are not free to do so when they sit in diversity, unless the applicable state
law recognizes the ‘bad-faith’ exception to the general rule against fee shifting.” Chambers v. NASCO,
501 U.S. 32, 51 (1991). The Supreme Court held that sanctions by the court did not implicate either of
the twin aims of Erie because they would not lead to forum shopping because issuing sanctions under
the bad-faith exception doesn’t depend on the victorious party to the lawsuit, but rather on the actions of
the parties during the litigation, which would fail to lead to forum shopping. Id. at 53. The Supreme
Court next concluded that the decision would not lead to inequitable administration of the laws because
the parties to the dispute had the ability to decide whether they would receive sanctions based on their
behavior and both citizens and non-citizens were able to be sanctioned. See id.
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A. I.F.C. Credit Corporation v. United Business & Industrial Federal
Credit Union
In I.F.C. Credit Corporation v. United Business & Industrial Federal
Credit Union, the the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied Illinois
state law in concluding that a waiver of a right to a trial by jury found in
a lease provision was valid and enforceable. 84 I.F.C. involved a
telecommunications equipment and services provider, Norvergence,
which entered into contractual agreements with customers that contained
forum-selection and mandatory bench trial provisions. 85 I.F.C. Credit
Corporation was a commercial factor that purchased the right to
payments under the contractual agreements between Norvergence and its
customers. 86 I.F.C. filed the action to enforce the mandated bench trial
clause contained in Norvergence’s contracts with customers in order to
recover payments due under those contracts. 87
The Seventh Circuit first concluded that the enforcement of the
contractual waiver was governed by Illinois state law. 88 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on Abbott Labs. v. Tokeda Pharm. Co., 89
which dealt with the validity of a forum selection clause and held that
the clause’s validity would be determined under the law of the
jurisdiction that controlled the remainder of the contractual agreement. 90
I.F.C. argued that under Simler v. Connor, 91 the validity of the bench
trial clause was to be determined under federal law. 92 In Simler v.
Connor, the Supreme Court held that a right to a jury trial was to be
determined under federal law, in all actions. 93 The Seventh Circuit
found that although federal law controls the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment, “[i]t does not follow that national law also controls the

84. See I.F.C. Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 991–92
(7th Cir. 2008).
85. See id. at 991.
86. See id. Norvergence’s business was successful for some time, but the corporation’s success
was halted after its products were found to lack the benefits that had been advertised. See id.
Subsequently, Norvergence discontinued providing services to customers, who in turn stopped payment
under their contracts. See id.
87. See id. The district court held that the mandatory bench trial provision was invalid and the
issue was submitted to a jury. See id. The jury returned a verdict on the suit for payments for the
defendant, United Business & Industrial Federal Credit Union. See id.
88. See id. at 991–92.
89. Abbott Labs. v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2007).
90. See id. at 423.
91. Simler v. Connor, 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
92. I.F.C., 512 F.3d at 991.
93. Simler, 372 U.S. at 222.
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validity of a contractual agreement to a bench trial.” 94 The court stated
that under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 95 no general federal law of contracts
exists. 96
Next, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the UCC 97 governed the
validity of the contractual waiver of a jury right because Illinois enacted
the UCC. 98 The court concluded that under the UCC, form contract
terms are enforceable unless there is a “battle of the forms” or the terms
of the agreement are unconscionable, neither of which applied to the
contractual waiver. 99 The court concluded that there were no relevant
UCC provisions requiring any separate-signing or separate-negotiation
for contractual agreements mandating bench trials. 100 With regard to
form agreements, the state of Illinois “honors straightforward terms with
understandable meanings,” 101 and the court found no ambiguities in the
bench trial clause. 102
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit addressed the Second and Sixth Circuit
arguments that the contractual waiver of the right to a jury trial requires
“knowing and intelligent” waiver by comparing this heightened standard
to the relatively low standards of waiver under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 38 and contractual agreements to arbitrate. 103 The Seventh
Circuit stated that the heightened scrutiny placed on contractual waivers
of the jury right would be inconsistent with the fact that a person can
waive the right merely by “accidental forfeiture.” 104 Along with
accidental waiver under Rule 38, the court held that agreements to
arbitrate, which forfeit jury trial rights along with rights to any judicial
forum, are not subject to the scrutiny given to contractual waivers of the
right to a trial by jury. 105 I.F.C. established that contractual waivers of
the right to a jury trial should be resolved by applying state law.

94. I.F.C., 512 F.3d at 991.
95. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
96. I.F.C., 512 F.3d at 991–92.
97. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 20.
98. I.F.C., 512 F.3d at 992.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Nicor, Inc. v. Assoc. Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd., 860 N.E.2d 280, 285–86 (Ill.
2006)).
102. Id.
103. Rule 38 states “[a] party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed. A
proper demand may be withdrawn only if the parties consent.” FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d).
104. I.F.C., 512 F.3d at 993.
105. Id. at 994.
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B. National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix
In National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 106 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a loan repayment contract provision
forfeiting the right to a jury trial was invalid and unenforceable under
federal law because there was no evidence of knowing and intentional
relinquishment of the right to a jury trial. 107 H. Walter Hendrix owned a
construction company and purchased two pieces of equipment, which
created large outstanding debts to be paid down on a monthly basis.108
Hendrix became unable to pay down the required amounts under the
debts and sought a solution to his financial dilemma. 109 Hendrix entered
into an agreement with National Equipment Rental (NER) whereby
NER paid Hendrix’s outstanding debts and in turn, Hendrix would make
monthly payments to NER. 110 Without explanation, the Second Circuit
applied federal law to the issue of the contractual waiver of the right to a
trial by jury. 111
The Second Circuit briefly addressed the issue of the standard to be
applied in determining the validity of contractual waivers of jury trial
rights. The court cited Johnson v. Zerbst 112 for the proposition that “[i]t
is elementary that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury is fundamental
and that its protection can only be relinquished knowingly and
intentionally.” 113 The court failed to note that Johnson was a criminal
case involving the validity of a voluntary waiver of the Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel. 114 The court concluded that
the location of the waiver “literally buried in the eleventh paragraph of a
fine print, sixteen clause agreement” did not satisfy the alleged knowing
and intentional waiver requirement for the Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial. 115
Along with Johnson, the Second Circuit quoted Justice Black’s
dissenting opinion in Equipment Rental, Ltd., v. Szukhent, which argued
that a printed form provision “buried in a multitude of words is too weak
an imitation of a genuine agreement to be treated as a waiver of so

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd., v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977).
See id. at 258.
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id. at 257.
See id. at 258.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258.
See Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258.
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important a constitutional safeguard.” 116 In Szukhent, the Supreme
Court upheld a form provision regarding service of process on an agent
specified in the contractual agreement. 117 In distinguishing this
decision, the Second Circuit argued that the right to a jury trial is more
fundamental than the right to personal service and requires knowing and
intentional waiver. 118 Lastly, the Second Circuit argued that the
contractual waiver failed to satisfy the knowing and intentional
requirement as a result of the gross inequality in bargaining power of the
parties to the contract. 119
National Equipment established that
contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial are governed by the federal
“knowing and intentional standard.” 120
C. K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co.
In K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 121 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a contractual waiver of a jury right provision in a
financing agreement was invalid and unenforceable under federal law.122
K.M.C. was a wholesale and retail grocery corporation which entered
into a financing agreement with Irving, whereby Irving obtained an
interest in K.M.C.’s accounts receivable and inventory and in return
provided K.M.C. with a line of credit that was originally $3 million and
was later extended to $3.5 million. 123 In 1982, Irving refused to advance
K.M.C. money under the agreement, which was within the $3.5 million
limit, and K.M.C. filed an action for a breach of a duty of good faith
performance against Irving. 124
At trial, although the financing
agreement contained a provision waiving a right to a trial by jury, the
Magistrate ordered a jury trial as a result of a statement by K.M.C.’s
president that before the agreement was signed, an Irving representative
informed him that the jury waiver would not be enforced. 125 The jury
returned a verdict in favor of K.M.C. and awarded over $7.5 million in
damages for the breach of contract violation. 126
116. Id. (quoting Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd., v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 332–33 (1964) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
117. Id. at 258 n.1.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)).
120. Id. at 258.
121. K.M.C. Co., Inc., v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
122. See id. at 755–58.
123. Id. at 754.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 755.
126. Id.
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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit briefly concluded that the right to a jury
trial was to be determined by federal, not state law. 127 The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that “the constitutional right to jury trial may only be waived if
done knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally, and that whether this
standard was met in a given case is a constitutional question separate
and distinct from the operation of rules of substantive contract law.” 128
Next, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of what standard should
apply to determine the validity of contractual waiver of a jury right. The
court acknowledged that the Supreme Court, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 129 “in
applying the knowing and voluntary standard to a waiver of due process
rights in a conditional sales agreement, cautioned that it was ‘not
holding that [the] standards [governing waiver of constitutional rights in
a criminal proceeding] must necessarily apply.’” 130 In Fuentes, the
Supreme Court established that a waiver of a constitutional right “must,
at the very least, be clear.” 131
Following the Sixth Circuit’s
acknowledgment that the Supreme Court’s language could be interpreted
as setting forth ambiguous standards to be applied to contractual waivers
of a jury right, the Sixth Circuit maintained its position relying on the
bandwagon effect and arguing that an overwhelming majority of cases
dealing with the validity of contractual waivers of jury rights applied the
knowing and voluntary standard. 132
The Sixth Circuit also acknowledged the irregularity between the
knowing and voluntary standard applied to contractual waivers of jury
trials and the enforcement of inadvertent waivers of the same right under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(d). 133 While Rule 39(b) grants the
court discretion in granting the right to jury trials after a party fails to
demand the right, “it is settled today that the mere statement of
‘oversight’ or ‘inadvertence’ does not suffice to invoke the discretion of
the court.” 134 The Sixth Circuit responded to this by noting that the
distinction between a pre-litigation contractual waiver and a procedural
error made after the initiation of litigation created a valid rationale for

127. Id. (citing Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963)).
128. Id. at 755–56.
129. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
130. Irving, 757 F.2d at 756 (quoting Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 94).
131. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95.
132. See Irving, 757 F.2d at 756 (citing Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258
(2d Cir. 1977); N. Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982); Sanchez v.
Sirmons, 467 N.Y.S.2d 757, 760 (1983)).
133. Id. at 756 n.4.
134. Id. (quoting 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 39.09, at 39–30 (2d
ed. 1984)).
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the opposing standards. 135 To support this proposition, the court cited
Francis v. Henderson, 136 where the Supreme Court acknowledged that
in criminal cases the interests of “the orderly administration of criminal
justice” would allow for constitutional rights to be subject to procedural
default. 137
In reaching its conclusion that the contract waiver was invalid, the
Sixth Circuit reasoned that the contractual waiver in the financing
agreement failed both the knowing and voluntary and “clear” standards
due to the understanding of K.M.C.’s president that the jury waiver
provision would not be enforced. 138
IV. DISCUSSION
This Comment argues that the language in Simler v. Connor is not
applicable to cases involving contractual waivers of the right to a jury
trial. Next, this Comment conducts an Erie analysis on the issue of
contractual waivers of the jury right and concludes that there is no
bright-line rule for which law should apply. Finally, this Comment
argues that if federal law is to be applied, the federal standard should not
be the heightened knowing, voluntary, and independent standard that has
been applied in criminal cases involving waiver, but rather the lower
standard consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 38.
A. Simler Does Not Apply
Cases use the language in Simler v. Conner 139 that “the right to a jury
trial in the federal courts is to be determined as a matter of federal law in
diversity as well as other actions” 140 for the proposition that federal law
automatically applies to contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial.
Taken out of context, the assertion by the Supreme Court in Simler
could be viewed as being determinative of the choice of law dispute
present between the circuit courts. Simler involved a dispute over
whether a claim was legal or equitable, 141 which determines the right to
a trial by jury in federal courts. However, the dispute in Simler did not

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
Irving, 757 F.2d at 756 (quoting Francis, 425 U.S. at 539).
Id. at 757.
Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
Id. at 222.
Id.
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involve a contractual waiver of the right to a jury trial, nor did the court
address any issues of federal common law regarding contractual waivers
of the right to a jury trial. Thus, the language of the Supreme Court in
Simler has no bearing on the validity of a contractual waiver of the right
to a jury trial. Under this interpretation of Simler, a full analysis of the
choice of law conflict is required.
This interpretation of Simler may generate criticism for underplaying
the Court’s seemingly strong language. Under a stronger reading of the
Simler language, which would assume that the contractual waiver of a
jury right is implicitly encompassed by the language of the Court, the
result would be an application of federal law to the issue of contractual
waivers. This interpretation still does not completely resolve the issue
because there is no federal law on the issue of contractual waivers of the
right to a jury trial. 142 While the choice of law issue would be
eliminated, no statutes or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directly
addresses the contractual waiver of the Seventh Amendment right. 143
There still must be a determination of what the content of the federal law
should be under the guidance of United States v. Kimbell Foods. 144
B. Erie Analysis
Courts must conduct a full Erie analysis in order to determine
whether state or federal law is to be applied when determining the
validity of contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial. The first step
is to determine whether a federal rule or statute directly governs the
issue of the validity of contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial. If
no rule or statute exists, the Erie analysis then moves to whether the
application of federal law would implicate the twin aims of Erie. If
application of the federal waiver standard would lead to either forum
shopping or an inequitable administration of the law, state law must be
applied.
1. REA
The first hurdle in conducting an Erie analysis is to determine
whether a federal rule or federal procedural statute covers the issue in

142. Sternlight, supra note 14, at 678.
143. The FAA covers arbitration agreements, which implicitly include waivers of the right to a
jury trial, but to the best of the author’s knowledge, the FAA standard has not been applied by federal
courts sitting in diversity.
144. U.S. v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
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controversy. 145 The statute or rule must be “sufficiently broad to cause a
direct collision with state law or implicitly control the issue before the
Court.” 146 Rule 38 is the only relevant rule governing waiver of the jury
right, but the rule is not sufficiently broad to govern the validity of
contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial. Rule 38(d) establishes a
procedure whereby a party in a suit waives the right to a jury if the right
is not demanded. 147 As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissenting
opinion in Stewart, the allegedly conflicting federal provision “nowhere
mention[ed] contracts or agreements, much less that the validity of
certain contracts or agreements will be matters of federal law,” and
therefore did not sufficiently conflict with state law. 148 Similarly, Rule
38(d) contains no language mentioning contracts, agreements, or the
validity of such agreements, and therefore is not sufficiently broad to
automatically govern the choice of law issue surrounding contractual
waivers of the right to a jury trial. In concluding that the federal venue
provision did not govern the dispute, Justice Scalia noted that “it is
difficult to believe that state contract law was meant to be pre-empted by
this provision that we have said ‘should be regarded as a federal judicial
housekeeping measure.’” 149 Justice Scalia’s language is applicable to
Rule 38(d), which could be viewed as a “housekeeping measure” to
ensure that litigants follow the proper steps in requesting a jury. Federal
Rule 38(d) is not sufficiently broad to cover the issue of contractual
waivers of the right to a jury trial because the statute contains no
language relevant to contracts, agreements, and applicable laws, and
because the Rule is merely a “housekeeping measure” used to ensure
proper requests for the jury right that in no way encompasses the issue
of contractual jury right waivers.
Similarly, the Federal Arbitration Act does not directly govern the
validity of contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial. The Act
specifically addresses issues surrounding agreements to arbitrate. While
arbitration agreements implicitly include waivers of the right to a jury
trial, the Act does not explicitly govern contractual waivers and cannot
be read to encompass all forms of jury right waiver.
2. RDA
Because no federal rule or statute directly governs the issue of
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 34 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. (citing Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987)).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d).
Stewart, 487 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636–37 (1964)).
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contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial, it must be determined
whether the twin aims of Erie are implicated by the application of
federal law. Due to the ambiguous federal standard and the varying
state laws, no bright-line rule exists as to whether state or federal law
should be applied. Individual courts will need to engage in a twin aims
analysis on a case by case basis with regard to the laws of the state
implicated by the dispute. For the purposes of this Erie analysis, it will
be assumed that the federal standard is the frequently applied knowing,
independent, and voluntary standard. If application of the federal
standard would lead to either forum shopping or inequitable
administration of the law, the state standard must be applied.
a. Forum Shopping
Applying federal law will likely lead to forum shopping in cases
where the applicable state standard differs from the heightened federal
standard. Forum shopping will not be implicated in cases where the
applicable state law parallels the heightened federal law standard. In
states such as Illinois, which apply UCC contract standards, 150 forum
shopping would be implicated by application of federal law. Consistent
with Justice Scalia’s conclusion of the implication of forum shopping
with regard to forum selection clauses in Stewart, 151 here, plaintiffs
seeking to enforce waivers would sue in state court to reap the
advantageous, less rigorous state standard governing validity, where
nonresidents seeking to avoid enforcement of the waiver would seek out
the more favorable and more stringent federal standard in federal court.
In states such as Georgia and California, which expressly prohibit
contractual waivers of the jury right, 152 forum shopping would also be
implicated. Litigants seeking to avoid waivers will sue in state court
where the waiver has no chance of surviving the express prohibition,
where litigants seeking to enforce the waivers will seek the somewhat
more advantageous federal standards in federal court that would at least
give a possibility for the waiver to be found valid.
In contrast, application of federal law would not lead to forum
shopping in states with standards similar to the heightened federal
standard. In these instances, there would be no added benefit to a
litigant filing suit in either forum. There can be no bright-line rule for a
150. I.F.C. Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir.
2008).
151. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 39–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Thomley, supra note 22, at 127 (citing Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 799 (Ga.
1994); Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 493 (Cal. 2005)).
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determination of whether forum shopping will be encouraged by the
application of federal law because of the varying state standards as well
as the ambiguous federal standard.
b. Inequitable Administration of the Law
If application of federal law is not found to lead to forum shopping,
the federal court must next determine whether application of federal law
would lead to inequitable administration of the law. Inequitable
administration of the laws requires “allowing an unfair discrimination
between noncitizens and citizens of the forum state.” 153 The analysis
regarding this prong of the twin aims of Erie is somewhat unclear.
Justice Scalia noted that a determination of whether the discrimination
would be unfair turned upon the importance of the issue in question. 154
In states where the state standard is lower than the federal standard
applied to waivers, a nonresident plaintiff seeking to enforce the waiver
will sue a resident defendant in the state court. This gives the
nonresident plaintiff a “unilateral choice” whether or not to enforce the
contractual waiver. 155 “A resident defendant cannot remove the action
to federal court.” 156 This gives the nonresident plaintiff a unilateral
choice of which standard will be applied to govern the waiver. “On the
other hand, a nonresident defendant can remove [a case] to federal
court.” 157 This establishes that a nonresident plaintiff and a nonresident
defendant are given a benefit over a resident defendant 158 in determining
what standard will be applied to the enforceability of the contractual
waiver of the right to a jury trial. “This is the kind of discrimination by
‘non-citizens against citizens’ that Erie tried to avoid.” 159
Some have argued that this does not lead to inequitable administration
because a resident plaintiff is able to file suit in federal or state court
against a nonresident defendant. 160 If the plaintiff seeks to avoid
enforcement of the waiver and files suit in state court, the nonresident

153. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 74–75 (1938)).
154. Id. (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965)).
155. Robert A. de By, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for Erie
Purposes, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1080 (1989).
156. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938)).
160. Id. (citing P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 788 (3d ed. 1988)).
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defendant can remove the case to federal court. 161 Removal to federal
court is not an option for a resident defendant, therefore, “compared to
another resident plaintiff who sues a co-citizen, the resident plaintiff
suing the nonresident defendant is at a disadvantage.” 162
In states where the federal and state standards parallel each other, the
problems that lead to inequitable administration of the laws will not
occur. Decisions by resident and nonresident plaintiffs and defendants
alike will not be altered by the option of federal or state court. There
will be no advantage to filing in state or federal court, and there will also
be no benefit to nonresidents in being able to remove cases filed in state
court to federal court because the applicable standards will be the same.
Therefore, there is no bright-line determination of whether or not
application of federal law will lead to inequitable administration of the
laws. This will only occur in cases where the federal and state standards
applied to contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial are dissimilar.
C. Federal Standard
If an Erie analysis concludes that federal law is to be applied in a
diversity case involving a contractual waiver of a jury right, there is still
no clear federal standard to be applied. 163 This Comment recommends
that the applicable federal standard that should be applied should be a
lower contract standard that is consistent with the lower standards set
forth in the Federal Arbitration Act and more consistent with the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 38(d) “inadvertence” standard, rather than the
heightened “intelligent, knowing and voluntary” standard that has been
commonly applied in lower courts. Adoption of a federal standard that
is consistent with standards applied to other forms of jury right waiver
will lead to a more uniform application of laws regarding jury right
waiver and more homogeneous results with regard to the outcome of
litigation involving jury right waivers.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts cannot continue to skirt the choice of law issue by failing to
engage in a full and complete Erie analysis and placing unwarranted
reliance on the Supreme Court’s language in Simler. There can be no
bright-line rule under Erie as to whether federal or state law should be
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1080–81 (citing John H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693,
712 (1974)).
163. See supra notes 14–19.
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applied because in certain circumstances, federal law significantly
differs from state law, and in other instances, federal law and state law
parallel each other. Federal courts sitting in diversity must engage in a
full analysis under Erie to determine whether application of federal law
will lead to forum shopping or inequitable administration of the law.
While most courts appear to adopt the criminal law waiver standard
of “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent” waiver, the federal standard is
somewhat unclear. A federal standard should be adopted that is more
consistent with the FAA and Rule 38(d), which would apply contract
standards of waiver in determining the validity of a contractual waiver
of the right to a jury trial.
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